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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 As with other network-based industries, regulation of electric 
power continues to evolve and embrace market-based reforms. These 
reforms include the Federal Energy Regulatory Committee’s (FERC) 
expanded regulatory authority to mandate open access to electric 
power transmission infrastructure and to force vertically integrated 
electric power wholesalers/transmitters to “wheel” power of their 
competitors.1 The continuing changes in the wholesale electric power 
market’s regulatory scheme have fueled a discussion over the role of 
antitrust law in the industry.2 Similarly, deregulatory changes in 
other regulated industries, such as telecommunications, have 
spawned a similar debate.3  
                                                                                                                      
 *. J.D., Florida State University College of Law;  I would like to thank Jim Rossi for 
his comments on earlier drafts of this article.  
 1. See discussion infra Part IV.C.   
 2. This discussion is occurring in several areas of antitrust law, including the util-
ity’s use of the filed rate defense, see Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial 
Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591 (2003), and the price-squeeze 
doctrine, see Greg Goelzhauser, Comment, Price Squeeze in a Deregulated Electric Power 
Industry, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 225 (2004), and Lawrence J. Spiwak, Is the Price Squeeze 
Doctrine Still Viable in Fully-Regulated Energy Markets?, 14 ENERGY L.J. 75 (1993).  
 3. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, The Remedy for the “Bottleneck Monopoly” in Tele-
com: Isolate It, Share It, or Ignore It?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Gold-
wasser, the Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 
(2003).  
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 An issue of particular concern in wholesale electric power regula-
tion (as well as antitrust law generally4) is the further need for the 
essential facilities doctrine, given the current authority of FERC to 
compel competition in the industry. The essential facilities doctrine, 
which emerged from the United States Courts of Appeal in the late 
1970s, generally states that an owner of an “essential facility” has a 
duty to grant others access to the facility and that refusing such ac-
cess violates section 2 of the Sherman Act.5 In circuits where the doc-
trine is recognized, an essential facilities claim is applicable to all in-
dustries (regulated or unregulated), but most commentators recog-
nize that essential facilities claims have a “larger place” within regu-
lated markets.6  
 Since being introduced as a theory of antitrust recovery, however, 
the essential facilities doctrine has endured a great amount of criti-
cism.7 The author of the leading treatise on antitrust law has dubbed 
the doctrine as “one of the most troublesome, incoherent and unman-
ageable of bases for Sherman § 2 liability.”8 Additionally, the United 
States Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to formally adopt the 
essential facilities doctrine.9 Regardless of the nearly universal criti-
cism of the doctrine, it is still considered a viable cause of action in 
most circuits under the Sherman Act. This conventional wisdom par-
ticularly applies to Sherman Act claims in the sphere of wholesale 
electric power markets given that Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States,10 a case where the Supreme Court ordered a vertically inte-
grated electric power utility to wheel power for a competitor, is con-
sidered by some to be a significant part of the foundation of the es-
sential facilities doctrine, as crafted in the lower courts.  
 Recently, however, in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Of-
fices of Curtis V. Trinko,11 the United States Supreme Court cast 
doubt for the first time over the continuing viability of essential fa-
cilities claims in regulated markets. Although Trinko involved anti-
trust claims in the context of telecommunications regulation under 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See Stanley M. Gorinson, Overview: Essential Facilities and Regulation, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 871 (1989) (discussing the practical difficulties in implementing antitrust 
remedies under the essential facilities doctrine in regulated industries).  
 5. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE § 7.7, at 306 (2d ed. 1999).  
 6. Id. § 19.5, at 708. Professor Hovenkamp argues that the major essential facilities 
doctrine cases share a common thread—regulatory policy created the alleged essential fa-
cility. Examples of policy creating the essential facility are telephone directories, the con-
nection of terminal equipment to telephone lines, interconnection with railway lines, and 
electric transmission lines. Id.  
 7. See infra Part II.A.  
 8. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 7.7, at 305.   
 9. See infra Part II.A.  
 10. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
 11. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  
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the Telecommunications Act of 1996, this Comment argues that the 
language used by the Court almost certainly forecloses most future 
essential facilities claims in the electric power context. Further, as a 
policy matter, there is a strong argument that FERC’s authority to 
compel open access and wheeling should replace claims under the es-
sential facilities doctrine, as FERC is more likely to have the exper-
tise and flexibility necessary to address competitive concerns in elec-
tric power markets that is largely lacking in federal courts. Thus, ju-
dicial “regulation” under the Sherman Act would be overly duplici-
tous and costly. However, the courts should not completely abdicate 
their role in addressing antitrust concerns in the electric power in-
dustry. This Comment argues that antitrust claims similar to those 
addressed in Otter Tail should remain available to plaintiffs as a 
method of redress when an electric power company’s anticompetitive 
conduct evades regulation. In this regard, Otter Tail should not be 
considered an essential facilities case, but an example of anticom-
petitive conduct within a regulated industry rooted in the competi-
tive concerns of section 2 of the Sherman Act.  
 Part II of this Comment discusses the basis of the essential facili-
ties doctrine in decisions of the United States Supreme Court, its 
subsequent development in the circuit courts, and some of its prevail-
ing criticisms. Part III explores Trinko and its implications on essen-
tial facilities claims in the context of regulated markets. Part IV 
briefly discusses the structure of the electric power industry and de-
scribes FERC’s authority to ensure a competitive market in electric 
power wholesale and transmission, including the effect of the 1992 
Energy Policy Act and FERC Order No. 888. Part V discusses the use 
of essential facilities claims in electric power litigation.  Part VI ar-
gues that the above statutes and policies, under Trinko, effectively 
remove most essential facilities claims from antitrust litigation in 
the electric power wholesale market. Part VI also argues that the 
elimination of such claims, as a policy matter, is beneficial because 
FERC, rather than the courts, is a more appropriate body to ensure 
competition in the electric power market, as opposed to the courts. 
However, § 2 Sherman Act claims under Otter Tail should remain 
available to address gaps in FERC’s regulatory scheme. Part VII con-
cludes this Comment.  
II.   THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
 Prior to discussing the development of the essential facilities doc-
trine, a basic explanation of Sherman Act claims is necessary. Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
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clared to be illegal.”12 Section 2 of the Act states that “[e]very person 
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”13 Anticompetitive conduct fal-
ling under section 1 typically involves “combinations” or a contract, 
and thus, it typically involves more than one entity—such as group 
refusals to deal and horizontal price fixing.14 Section 2 claims primar-
ily involve unilateral action by a single entity, such as unilateral re-
fusals to deal.15 Essential facilities claims are generally categorized 
as unilateral refusals to deal under section 2 of the Sherman Act.16 It 
is important to note that under the antitrust laws, courts view con-
certed anticompetitive conduct of multiple firms (under section 1), 
such as a price-fixing arrangement, with much more suspicion than 
the action of a single entity, such as a unilateral refusal to deal with 
a rival.17 This is primarily due to the long standing principal of anti-
trust law that a firm, regardless of its market power, has the free-
dom to deal with whomever it wants and to set the terms under 
which it will deal with another.18  
 The following subparts will roughly summarize the basis and de-
velopment of the essential facilities doctrine in the federal courts. 
The development of the doctrine occurred primarily in the circuit 
courts; however, those circuits that have adopted the doctrine claim 
that it is rooted in several United States Supreme Court cases. 
Therefore, a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court decisions is 
necessary.  
A.   “Development” in the Supreme Court 
 Most courts and commentators consider the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n19 the “seminal 
case” in the evolution of the essential facilities doctrine.20 In Termi-
                                                                                                                      
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The statutory language of both section 1 and section 2 of the 
Sherman Act is admittedly ambiguous. Thus, antitrust jurisprudence has been largely de-
veloped through case law. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 2.1b.  
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 14. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1958) (discussing the various 
claims recognized as Sherman section 1 violations); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton, 471 U.S. 
1007, 1008 (1985) (“Section 1 proscribes concerted action—contracts, combinations, and 
conspiracies in restraint of trade.”). 
 15. Blanton, 471 U.S. at 1008 (“Section 2 regulates unilateral conduct by outlawing 
monopolization and attempted monopolization.”).  
 16. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 7.7, at 306.  
 17. Id.  
 18. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).  
 19. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).  
 20. Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177, 
1204 (2002).  
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nal Railroad, an antitrust action was brought against the Terminal 
Railroad Association of St. Louis, which was organized pursuant to 
an agreement between Jay Gould and several railroad companies.21 
The association was formed for the express purpose of obtaining and 
consolidating the properties of several terminal companies on each 
side of the Mississippi River in St. Louis, Missouri.22 After all acqui-
sitions were completed, Terminal Railroad had complete control of 
facilities required for loading and unloading freight traffic and pas-
sengers on both sides of the Mississippi River.23 The contract that 
formed Terminal Railroad Association ensured that only those com-
panies with a proprietary interest in the association were allowed to 
use the association’s facilities, unless there was a unanimous vote al-
lowing use by a nonproprietary company.24  
 The Court held that Terminal Railroad’s combination ownership 
of all rail facilities in St. Louis violated the Sherman Act.25 A primary 
reason for the Court’s decision was the ability of Terminal Railroad 
to exclude competitors from the only rail facilities traversing the 
Mississippi in St. Louis.26 As a remedy, however, the Court did not 
dissolve Terminal Railroad but mandated that they admit all com-
peting railroads to ownership on the same terms as existing mem-
bers.27 
 Terminal Railroad is commonly included in the line of cases that 
establish the essential facilities doctrine,28 yet the notion that Termi-
nal Railroad’s reasoning is readily applicable to the modern essential 
facilities doctrine is not without its critics. One commentator has 
noted the difficulty in reading a doctrine of shared access into the 
Terminal Railroad decision:  
The Court made no theoretical or doctrinal generalizations. It 
seems to have accepted defendants’ arguments that duplicate fa-
cilities were impractical (though this is not entirely clear), but it 
did not derive from that any reliable generalizations about what 
this implied. Although it chose to remedy the violation in this case 
by ordering shared access to the facilities, it conceded that the 
                                                                                                                      
 21. 224 U.S. at 391. Initially, Terminal Railroad consisted of six members but was 
later expanded to include fourteen.  Id. at 399. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 393-95. See also Abbot B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facili-
ties, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1999).  
 24. Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 399-400. 
 25. Id. at 406-09.  
 26. Id. at 401 (“That through their ownership and exclusive control [Terminal Rail-
road is] in possession of advantages in respect to the enormous traffic which must use the 
St. Louis gateway is undeniable.”).  
 27. Id. at 411-12.  
 28.  HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, §7.7, at 306. 
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government’s preferred remedy of dissolution . . . might be neces-
sary.29 
Another valid criticism is that Terminal Railroad is distinguishable 
from most modern essential facilities cases because it involved con-
certed activity, which, as previously noted, is more suspect under the 
Sherman Act. Thus, as Herbert Hovenkamp notes, Terminal Rail-
road “makes a poor ancestor for the essential facility doctrine, be-
cause it was a § 1 case, involving an agreement among multiple firms 
who controlled the facility.”30  
 Two other Supreme Court decisions typically associated with the 
development of the essential facilities doctrine are Associated Press 
v. United States31 and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States.32 Associ-
ated Press, considered “a more doubtful case” than Terminal Rail-
road by some,33 involved a news cooperative (AP) whose membership 
included approximately 1200 daily newspapers.34 AP collected news 
from its own staff, as well as affiliates and each of the 1200 member 
newspapers.35 All member newspapers were entitled to access the 
news provided by any other member newspaper and AP.36 This ar-
rangement enabled members to collectively achieve economies of 
scale—“[t]he members collectively could support a reporter in Istan-
bul or a staff of economic experts to analyze antitrust decisions for 
the benefit of readers.”37 The problem with the arrangement, in the 
Court’s opinion, was that AP’s bylaws prohibited members from sell-
ing news to anyone other than AP members, and they also gave each 
member the power to block nonmember competitors from member-
ship.38 This allowed a daily newspaper which was a member of AP to 
prevent a rival newspaper from receiving news from an AP mem-
ber.39 
 The Court held that the ability of AP members to discriminate 
against competitors in its admission policies violated section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.40 Although the Court’s reasoning was slightly un-
clear,41 it considered the exclusivity bylaw provisions in question un-
reasonable because, as implemented, they were used to destroy com-
                                                                                                                      
 29. Robinson, supra note 20, at 1205.  
 30. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, §7.7.  
 31. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).  
 32. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).  
 33. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 842 (1989). 
 34. 326 U.S. at 3-4. 
 35. Id. at 3.  
 36. Id. at 4. 
 37. Areeda, supra note 33, at 842.  
 38. 326 U.S. at 5-6.  
 39. Id. at 8-9.  
 40. Id. at 21-22. 
 41. Areeda, supra note 33, at 843.  
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petition.42 Professor Areeda summarizes the perceived black letter 
law of Associated Press in the following manner:  
(1) whenever competitors jointly create a useful facility, (2) that is 
essential to the competitive vitality of rivals, (3) and (perhaps) es-
sential to the competitive vitality of the market, (4) and admission 
of rivals is consistent with the legitimate purposes of the venture, 
then (5) the collaborators must admit rivals on relatively equal 
terms.43  
 As with Terminal Railroad, the primary criticism of Associated 
Press as a basis for the essential facilities doctrine is that it involved 
the concerted group activity of several entities, as opposed to the uni-
lateral activity of a single entity.44 This criticism is important be-
cause the modern essential facilities doctrine primarily concerns uni-
lateral refusals to deal.45 Another important distinction between the 
factual background of Associated Press and current essential facili-
ties cases concerns the available remedies to the alleged anticompeti-
tive conduct. Thus, the available remedy in Associated Press (admis-
sion to the joint venture) is both relatively easy to administer and 
does not entail day-to-day monitoring and control.46 
 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States47 is the first Supreme Court 
case that resembles a modern essential facilities claim.48 The case is 
also important, for the purposes of this Comment, because it involved 
a fully integrated electric power company’s refusal to wheel, or dis-
tribute power, to a municipality. Otter Tail Power was an investor-
owned utility (IOU) that generated and transmitted electric power to 
the majority of towns in Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Da-
kota.49 Several towns, however, received their power through mu-
nicipal power companies that purchased low-rate power from the 
Federal Bureau of Reclamation Projects outside Otter Tail’s power 
grid. The power purchased from these projects, though, had to be 
“wheeled” over Otter Tail’s transmission lines to the individual mu-
nicipalities.50 Otter Tail resisted the efforts of the municipalities’ at-
                                                                                                                      
 42. 326 U.S. at 15.   
 43. Areeda, supra note 33, at 844.  
 44. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 7.7; Areeda, supra note 33, at 844-45.  
 45. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 7.7.  
 46. Areeda, supra note 33, at 844-45.  
 47. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).  
 48. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, §7.7. Lipsky and Sidak refer to it as “the high-water 
mark of the essential facilities doctrine.” Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 23, at 1205.  
 49. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368. 
 50. Id. at 370-71. 
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tempts to purchase power from other sources by refusing to allow use 
of its transmission lines.51  
 Though the Supreme Court did not rule against Otter Tail based 
on the essential facilities doctrine,52 it did hold that Otter Tail’s con-
duct violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.53 A unique obstacle to the 
Court, however, was the interrelation of the Sherman Act with exist-
ing regulations of electric power companies under the Federal Power 
Act. Otter Tail argued that its refusals to deal with the municipali-
ties were immune from antitrust prosecution because the Federal 
Power Commission (FPC) had the power to compel involuntary inter-
connections of power under the Federal Power Act.54 The Court re-
jected this contention because the interconnection provision of the 
Federal Power Act primarily emphasized voluntary interconnection 
agreements—in that the FPC could not mandate interconnection 
unless a power company refused to interconnect voluntarily.55 Even 
when the FPC could order an involuntary interconnection, its author-
ity in this regard was subject to restrictions unrelated to antitrust 
concerns.56  
 Once the Court disposed of Otter Tail’s regulatory argument, it 
held that “Otter Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its ser-
vice area to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, or 
to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust laws.”57 Thus, 
the district court’s decree ordering Otter Tail to wheel and/or sell 
wholesale power to the municipal power companies was upheld.  
 The Otter Tail decision was different, both factually and doctri-
nally, from Terminal Railroad and Associated Press. First, the anti-
competitive conduct challenged in Otter Tail consisted of the actions 
of a single firm. Second, “[n]ot only was the defendant a natural mo-
nopolist, it was regulated and its activities may have evaded that 
regulation, to the prejudice of consumers.”58 Finally, Otter Tail raised 
the issue of the ability of the courts to regulate and enforce, in terms 
of access, rates, and terms—a decree that forces multiple firms to 
contract with each other. The majority solved this remedial hurdle by 
holding that such regulation fell within the responsibility of FPC 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Id. at 368, 370-71.  Professor Hovenkamp notes “Otter Tail’s apparent purpose 
was to force the municipalities to become its own customers.” HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 
7.7.  
 52. The lower court did find Otter Tail guilty of anticompetitive conduct via the essen-
tial facilities doctrine. See United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D. 
Minn. 1971), modified, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).  
 53.  Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 378-79. 
 54. Id. at 372.  
 55. Id. at 373. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 377. 
 58. Areeda, supra note 33, at 848.  
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regulation—in that the FPC could regulate the rates Otter Tail 
charged.59 In short, the Court ordered Otter Tail to give the munici-
palities access to its transmission lines but delegated the more diffi-
cult task—the terms of such access—to a regulatory agency.  
 Professor Areeda believes that the existence of a regulatory infra-
structure to supervise the Court’s order makes Otter Tail a narrow 
case in the line of essential facilities cases.60 However, the FPC’s ad-
ministration of the Court’s order involved more than just ensuring 
open access at reasonable rates and with reasonable terms. In the 
case, Otter Tail Power raised the valid concern of forced access erod-
ing its system and damaging its ability to serve its customers.61 The 
majority opinion attempted to address this concern by simply stating 
that under federal statutes, the FPC could not order interconnection 
if to do so “would impair [the utility’s] ability to render adequate ser-
vice to its customers.”62 However, the difficulty remained as to how 
Otter Tail was to establish priorities between the competing requests 
for service over its grid.63 
 As stated above, many consider Otter Tail the first essential facili-
ties case at the Supreme Court level. There is a strong argument, 
though, that Otter Tail is not an essential facilities case but is rooted 
instead in the language of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The easiest 
argument in support of this contention is that, as with many other 
cases since Otter Tail, the lower court adopted the essential facilities 
doctrine and resolved the dispute on those grounds, but the Supreme 
Court refused to follow suit. Further, the Court’s antitrust analysis 
was not consistent with the elements of a modern essential facilities 
claim. In contrast, the Court’s analysis of Otter Tail Power’s conduct 
resembled a more traditional antitrust analysis under section 2 of 
the Sherman Act—the Court found that Otter Tail was a natural 
monopoly, and its refusal to wheel power for its competitors was mo-
tivated only by Otter Tail’s intention to exclude its competitors from 
the market and preserve its monopoly.64 
 The last case that many believe is part of essential facility juris-
prudence is Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.65 In 
                                                                                                                      
 59. 410 U.S. at 377. The partial dissenters in the case argued that FPC did not have 
regulatory jurisdiction over the decree. Id. at 392-93.  
 60. Areeda, supra note 33, at 848 (“Thus, the Court could airily require Otter Tail to 
deal but never burden itself with the administrative details, because the Federal Power 
Commission had the statutory authority and presumed expertness to regulate the prices 
and terms of dealing. Otter Tail is thus quite narrow.”). 
 61. 410 U.S. at 380. 
 62. Id. at 381 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (2000)). 
 63. Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 23, at 1207. 
 64. See also Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 79-CV-163, 1980 
WL 1889 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1980).  
 65. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).  
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Aspen, the owner of a downhill skiing facility brought a Sherman Act 
§ 2 action against an owner of three competing skiing facilities in As-
pen, Colorado. Initially, three separate owners operated the only 
three existing skiing facilities in Aspen—Ajax, Buttermilk, and High-
lands.66 The three facilities jointly agreed to offer an “all-Aspen” 
ticket, which allowed skiers flexibility and choice in which moun-
tain(s) they used.67 Eventually, Ski Co., the owner of Ajax, acquired 
ownership of Buttermilk, giving it control of two of three available 
skiing facilities.68  
 The all-Aspen pass agreement continued between Ski Co. and 
Highlands, but Ski Co. also introduced a rival pass involving only 
Ajax and Buttermilk.69 Soon thereafter, Ski Co. opened a new down-
hill facility—Snowmass.70 Though Ski Co.’s separate pass initially 
outsold the all-Aspen pass, this trend reversed itself when Snowmass 
opened.71 The all-Aspen pass continued for the next several years 
with only a few functional changes, such as how to divide revenues 
and physical changes to the pass itself.72 However, in 1977, Ski Co. 
only agreed to continue the pass if Highlands accepted a lower per-
centage share of the pass revenue.73 Though Highlands did not want 
to accept this change, it did so in order to continue to receive the 
marketing benefits of the all-Aspen pass.74 The following year the all-
Aspen pass ended when Ski Co. proposed an even lower percentage 
share of the pass revenue for Highlands, which Highlands found un-
acceptable.75 Thereafter, the only ski pass available was that of Ski 
Co.’s, which covered Snowmass, Buttermilk and Ajax.76 Highlands 
found it difficult to compete with Ski Co. and tried to duplicate the 
previous all-Aspen pass, but to no avail. Ski Co. even refused to sell 
Highlands the lift tickets to its facilities at retail costs.77  
 The Supreme Court, in analyzing Highlands’s Sherman Act claim 
against Ski Co., restated the general antitrust principle that a firm 
                                                                                                                      
 66. Id. at 587-88. 
 67. Id. at 589. The ticket was a six-day pass, consisting of a booklet of six coupons, 
which could be redeemed for daily lift tickets at either of the facilities. Id. The booklet’s 
price was lower than the price of buying individual tickets to each facility. Id. Revenues 
from the sale of the coupons were divided pro rata according to the number of coupons col-
lected by the individual facilities. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 589-90.  
 72. Id. at 590. 
 73. Id.  
 74. See id.  
 75. Id. at 592-93. 
 76. Id.  at 593. 
 77. Id. at 593-94.  
2005]                          SAVING OTTER TAIL 241 
 
with monopoly power has no duty to deal or cooperate with a rival.78 
The lack of this duty, however, did not mean that all refusals to deal 
with a competitor passed muster under antitrust laws—a firm’s re-
fusal to deal cannot evidence an intent to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly.79 In proceeding with its analysis, the Court examined the 
trial court record and determined that there was sufficient evidence 
to support the jury’s verdict that Ski Co.’s refusal to deal (its decision 
to discontinue the all-Aspen pass) with Highlands was not supported 
by a valid business justification.80 The Court emphasized the history 
of the parties’ dealings (in offering the pass) and the fact that Ski Co. 
refused to sell its tickets to Highlands at retail price.81  
 The Aspen case is important in terms of the essential facilities 
doctrine because many subsequent essential facilities cases have in-
corporated language from the decision.82 However, the Aspen analysis 
may be a strong indicator that the essential facilities doctrine is un-
necessary. Although the Tenth Circuit Aspen decision affirmed the 
jury’s decision on essential facilities grounds,83 the Supreme Court, 
as has been its custom, expressly refused to consider the case on es-
sential facilities terms, opting instead for a strict Sherman Act 
analysis.84 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp believes that the Court’s 
resolution of the Aspen case, without relying on the essential facili-
ties doctrine, is evidence that the doctrine is unnecessary—that 
courts only need to examine the defendant’s market power, its rea-
sons for refusing to deal, and the resulting competitive harms.85  
                                                                                                                      
 78. Id. at 600.  Interestingly, the issue of market power in the Aspen case was not pre-
served for appeal and the Court’s decision in Aspen was premised on the lower court’s find-
ing that Ski Co. was a monopolist. Id. at 587.  However, some believe the lower court’s 
holding that Ski Co. had market power was economically preposterous. See Lipsky & Si-
dak, supra note 23, at 1209.  Lipsky and Sidak state: 
[t]he ski slopes of Aspen were filled not with local residents, but with vacation-
ers who traveled to Aspen after choosing it over alternative ski resorts. By 
definition, therefore, producer substitutability should have made the relevant 
market not Aspen, Colorado but . . . ski resorts in the United States, Canada, 
and perhaps even Europe.  
Id.  
 79. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 603-04.  
 80. Id. at 608-11.  More specifically, the Court’s decision was based on the harm to 
consumers created by the elimination of the all-Aspen pass, Highlands decreasing market 
share since after the pass’s elimination, and Ski Co.’s failure to persuade the jury that it 
had a business justification for eliminating the pass. See Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 23, at 
1210-11.  
 81. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 593. 
 82. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, § 7.7.  
 83. Lipsky & Sidak, supra note 23, at 1208-09.  
 84. Id. at 1211.  
 85. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, §7.7, at 306. Hovenkamp further notes that it is unfor-
tunate that lower courts have not followed this route. Id. 
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B.   The “Modern” Essential Facilities Doctrine and Its Critics 
 A general statement of the essential facilities doctrine, as devel-
oped in the district and circuit courts, is “that the owner of a properly 
defined ‘essential facility’ has a duty to share it with others, and that 
a refusal to do so violates § 2 of the Sherman Act.”86 The elements of 
an essential facilities claim consist of “(1) control of the essential fa-
cility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or rea-
sonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of 
the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the fa-
cility.”87 The threshold inquiry that courts must satisfy before apply-
ing the elements of an essential facilities claim is whether or not the 
facility in question is “essential.”88  
Most of the things found by courts to be essential facilities have 
fallen into one of three classifications: (1) natural monopolies or 
joint venture arrangements subject to significant economies of 
scale; (2) structures, plants or other valuable productive assets 
that were created as part of a regulatory regime . . . ; or (3) struc-
tures that are owned by the government and whose creation or 
maintenance is subsidized.89  
The common thread between these three categories is that the owner 
of the facility has great cost advantages over those who seek access 
to it.90 Thus, an essential facility is basically a “relevant market for 
some input that is crucial to the production of some secondary prod-
uct.”91 Among regulated industries, the courts have held the follow-
ing facilities essential: telephone listings, the connection of terminal 
equipment to telephone lines, connections with railway lines, and of 
course, interconnection with electric transmission lines.92  
 The development of the essential facilities doctrine over the past 
few decades has spawned a great deal of criticism from commenta-
tors. The most prolific criticism of the doctrine has come from Phillip 
Areeda.93 Professor Areeda argues that no case “provides a consistent 
rationale for the doctrine” or “explores the social costs and benefits or 
the administrative costs of requiring the creator of an asset to share 
                                                                                                                      
 86. Id. 
 87. Id § 7.7 (quoting MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th 
Cir. 1983)).  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 7.7a. (footnotes omitted). 
 90. Id. Professor Hovenkamp argues that because “monopolization is a market power 
offense, a properly defined essential facility must define a relevant market or a substantial 
portion of one; alternatively, it must serve as a bottleneck that permits market power to be 
exercised in a properly defined relevant market.” Id. However, most courts have not re-
quired essential facilities plaintiffs to define such a market. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. § 19.5.  
 93. See Areeda, supra note 33.  
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it with a rival.”94 Thus, according to Areeda, essential facilities is 
“less a doctrine than an epithet . . . .”95 In order to cut off the risk of a 
continuing and ridiculous expansion of essential facilities claims, 
Areeda offers six limiting principles to guide any essential facilities 
inquiry: (1) compulsory access should be exceptional, (2) a facility is 
essential only when it is vital to a plaintiff’s vitality in the market 
and duplication of the facility is not practical, (3) courts should not 
order sharing unless it is likely to improve market conditions, (4) a 
legitimate business purpose defense should always be available, (5) a 
defendant’s intent should not be relevant—all refusals to deal intend 
to limit competition and increase profits, and (6) courts should not 
order compulsory access when the remedy is difficult to supervise.96 
 Professor Hovenkamp calls the essential facilities doctrine “trou-
blesome, incoherent, and unmanageable.”97 Professor Hovenkamp be-
lieves that a superior method of antitrust analysis in essential facili-
ties situations would be to refine the general refusal to deal doctrine 
in such a manner to include the more troublesome situations that 
may now fall though the cracks.98 Along these lines, Hovenkamp in-
fers that the doctrine, as it is currently applied, is unnecessary. First, 
if proper application of the essential facilities doctrine primarily ad-
dresses anticompetitive refusals to deal, the general principles of the 
Sherman Act are all that are needed to remedy the situation.99 How-
ever, if courts do not limit the application of the doctrine in this 
manner, the doctrine “loses its mooring in § 2 of the Sherman Act.”100  
 Other relevant criticisms from Professor Hovenkamp include the 
fact that forced sharing requires courts to set the terms of access 
and, in essence, function as an administrative agency.101 Unlike 
agencies, however, courts are ill-suited for a regulatory role, and 
thus, the court’s use of the essential facilities doctrine will not im-
                                                                                                                      
 94. Id. at 841. 
 95. Id. Professor Areeda likens the rise of the doctrine to other instances of “judging 
by catch-phrase.” Id. In these instances, an extreme case comes before a court that creates 
a response. The language of the court’s response is later used to expand the doctrine to the 
“limits of its language,” which leads to absurd results. Id. 
 96. Id. at 852-53.  
 97. HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, §7.7, at 305. 
 98. Id. (“The antitrust world would almost certainly be a better place if [the essential 
facilities doctrine] were jettisoned, with a little fine tuning of the general doctrine of the 
monopolist’s refusal to deal to fill in the resulting gaps.”). 
 99. Id. Both Otter Tail and Aspen are examples of where the Court was faced with an 
essential facilities situation and resolved the respective matters by employing traditional 
antitrust principles that have developed from the Sherman Act. Further, in both cases, the 
Court did not adopt and/or use the essential facilities doctrine to aid its analysis.  
 100. Id. § 7.7d. Hovenkamp states that if the doctrine is not rooted in general antitrust 
principles, it basically becomes a fair access statute that forces one firm to accommodate 
another even if it does not result in improved market conditions. “As a result, the doctrine 
is either superfluous or else inconsistent with basic antitrust principles.” Id.  
 101. Id. § 7.7d1.  
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prove consumer welfare.102 Additionally, mandated sharing reduces 
the incentive for market entrants to develop their own facilities or in-
frastructure—once a plaintiff has access to a defendant’s facility, he 
has no incentive to create his own facility.103 This runs counter to the 
competitive goals of the Sherman Act.104 
III.   ENTER TRINKO 
 The latest word from the Supreme Court with regard to the essen-
tial facilities doctrine occurred last year in Trinko.105 In Trinko, the 
Supreme Court ruled on the alleged anticompetitive conduct of a 
regulated entity—a local incumbent telephone exchange carrier.106 
The case is important for the purposes of this Comment because the 
Court addressed the interrelation of a regulatory scheme and anti-
trust claims. The Court also explicitly refused to recognize the essen-
tial facilities doctrine but gave an indication of when, if the doctrine 
were recognized, it would apply in the regulatory context.107  
 Verizon Communications was an incumbent local exchange car-
rier that served New York State.108 Under the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Verizon was required to share its network with competi-
tors, which included access to unbundled portions of their network.109 
Verizon also had a duty under the Act to give competitors access to 
its operation support systems (OSS)—without which the competitors 
                                                                                                                      
 102. Professor Hovenkamp offers the following example:  
[S]uppose that the defendant owns a gas pipeline from origin point X to market 
point Y. The cost of gas at point X is $10.00 per unit, and the cost of pipeline 
shipment to point Y is $2.00 per unit. But X is a monopolist and charges a de-
livered price of $15.00 per unit, thus capturing $3.00 in excess profits per unit 
shipped. Now a gas producer at point X, wishing to ship to point Y itself, uses 
the essential facility doctrine to obtain a judicial injunction ordering the defen-
dant to lease space on its pipeline . . . .   
Unless constrained by the court’s order the defendant will charge its profit-
maximizing price of $5.00 per unit shipped, reducing its own shipments accord-
ingly. The result is that the amount of gas shipped through the pipeline will 
remain unchanged and the price will not budge. The pipeline owner simply ob-
tains its monopoly overcharge through the lease of the pipeline rather than as 
a markup on the shipped gas.  
Id. 
 103. Id. § 7.7d2.  
 104. Id. Many of Professor Areeda’s proposed limiting principles, if enacted, would ad-
dress Hovenkamp’s many concerns. Thus, if the essential facilities doctrine were limited to 
situations where no forced dealing would occur unless it would substantially improve com-
petition in the market, then there would not be a need to worry about perverse anticom-
petitive incentives. Additionally, if courts limited application of the doctrine to situations 
where there was a clear and easily applicable remedy, it would go far in curtailing concern 
over the role of courts acting as administrative agencies.  
 105. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  
 106. Id. at 401-02. 
 107. Id. at 411. 
 108. Id. at 402.  
 109. Id.  
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could not fill their customers’ orders.110 In 1999, many of Verizon’s 
competitors complained to the FCC and the New York Public Service 
Commission (PSC) that Verizon was not meeting its obligations to 
provide access to OSS, as required by the Telecommunications Act, 
because many of their orders were not being filled.111 The FCC and 
the PSC both opened investigations into Verizon’s conduct, resulting 
in Verizon entering into a consent decree with the FCC and being 
subjected to several orders of the PSC.112  
 After Verizon entered into the consent decree, the Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko filed a complaint against it alleging “that Verizon 
had filled rivals’ orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anti-
competitive scheme to discourage customers from becoming or re-
maining customers of competitive LECs [local exchange carrier], thus 
impeding the competitive LECs’ ability to enter and compete in the 
market for local telephone service.”113 For this alleged anticompeti-
tive conduct, Trinko sought damages and injunctive relief under, in-
ter alia, section 2 of the Sherman Act.114  
 The Court’s analysis began with determining the effect of the 
Telecommunications Act’s regulatory scheme on the application of 
traditional antitrust principles.115 Although the Court stated that the 
Act would otherwise appear to be a candidate for implied immunity 
from antitrust laws, the antitrust savings clause in the statute pre-
cluded an interpretation of implied immunity.116 Thus, the Court held 
that the Telecommunications Act preserved antitrust claims that sat-
isfied existing standards, but it did not create new antitrust claims 
that go beyond those standards.117 
 Applying “existing” antitrust standards, the Court analyzed 
Trinko’s claim under the traditional section 2 rubric of a unilateral 
refusal to deal118 and held that the complaint failed to state a cause 
of action under the Sherman Act.119 Importantly, the Court, echoing 
the sentiments of Professor Hovenkamp, discussed the difficulties 
that arise when firms are compelled to provide competitors access to 
their infrastructure.120 First, forcing firms to grant access to their fa-
cilities is in tension with the purpose of antitrust law—that is, it may 
lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Id. at 403.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 403-04.  
 113. Id. at 404.  
 114. Id. at 405.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 406.  
 117. Id. at 407.  
 118. Id. at 407-09. 
 119. Id. at 410. 
 120. Id. at 407-08. 
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those economically beneficial facilities.121 Further, as noted by com-
mentators who have criticized the essential facilities doctrine,122 
compelled access requires courts to assume the role of central plan-
ners and identify the price and terms of the compelled access.123 
Lastly, compelling a relationship between two or more competitors 
may facilitate horizontal collusion—a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act.124 On these grounds, the Court reaffirmed the general antitrust 
principle that “the Sherman Act ‘does not restrict the long recognized 
right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private 
business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to par-
ties with whom he will deal.’ ”125 
 When addressing Trinko’s essential facilities claim, the Court re-
fused to either adopt or repudiate the doctrine—even though the cir-
cuit court concluded that Trinko’s complaint might state a claim on 
essential facilities grounds.126 The Court did state that even if the 
doctrine were viable, it would not apply to Trinko’s claim because 
“the indispensable requirement for invoking the doctrine is the un-
availability of access to the ‘essential facilities’; where access exists, 
the doctrine serves no purpose.”127 Where a state or federal agency ef-
fectively has the authority to “compel sharing and to regulate its 
scope and terms,” essential facilities claims should be denied.128 
Therefore, “[t]he 1996 Act’s extensive provision for access makes it 
unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access.”129  
 The effect of the Trinko decision on the essential facilities doctrine 
is apparent. Before Trinko, an essential facilities claim required 
proof of only the four elements discussed in Part II.B above. The es-
sential facilities doctrine post-Trinko is on more shaky ground in 
that, if a monopolist who has control over an essential facility falls 
under the jurisdiction of a regulatory body which can compel access 
to the essential facility and monitor the scope and terms of the ac-
cess, a plaintiff will not be able to use the essential facilities doctrine 
to compel open access under antitrust laws.  
IV.   THE REGULATED ENTERPRISE OF ELECTRIC POWER 
 This Part discusses the use of the essential facilities doctrine in 
the electric power industry. However, before summarizing the pre-
                                                                                                                      
 121. Id.   
 122. See supra Part II.B.  
 123. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).  
 126. Id. at 410.  
 127. Id. at 411. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
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vailing applications of the doctrine in this context, a discussion of the 
electric power industry’s structure and the role of FERC in regulat-
ing aspects of the industry is necessary.  
A.   Electric Power Industry Structure 
 Provision of electric power can be divided into three service com-
ponents: generation, transmission and distribution.130 Generation in-
volves producing electricity, mostly through power plants that use 
coal, oil, natural gas, or uranium as fuel.131 The transmission system 
moves the bulk power produced by a power plant to the consumer 
through an interconnected system of power lines.132 Finally, distribu-
tion involves transferring electricity to individual customers.133 The 
distribution system consists of elements that most people, as electric 
power consumers, are familiar with—substations, poles, and wires.134 
 Prior to more recent efforts to deregulate the electric power indus-
try, fully integrated firms (single corporations) or municipal power 
companies (public utilities) provided all three services discussed 
above.135 The new deregulatory model unbundles generation, trans-
mission, and distribution functions in an effort to subject the electric 
power industry to market forces. This results in market competition 
among the wholesale and retail power generation firms and a natu-
ral monopoly in transmission services. Thus, the move to a deregu-
lated model “reflects the view that generation and energy services 
can be competitive, but the ‘wires’ segments of the industry—
transmission and distribution—retain natural monopoly attributes 
and therefore need to remain subject to regulation.”136 As the indus-
try moves toward the deregulated model, several changes in the in-
dustry’s structure are occurring. The wholesale market for electric 
power generation is largely deregulated, and market forces, to a 
great extent, guide prices for wholesale electric power. Federal and 
state agencies, respectively, regulate the transmission and distribu-
tion of electric power. Additionally, some states are attempting to in-
crease competition in retail markets.137 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 654-57 
(2000).  
 131. Id. at 654-55.  
 132. Id. at 656.  
 133. Goelzhauser, supra note 2, at 227.  
 134. BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 657.  
 135. See id. at 654; Goelzhauser, supra note 2, at 228.  
 136. Thomas M. Lenard, FERC’s New Regulatory Agenda, J. REG. 36, 36 (Fall 2002). 
The deregulatory model depends, in large part, on four elements: (1) a deregulated whole-
sale generation market; (2) a federally regulated transmission market; (3) state regulated 
local distribution systems; and (4) active competition in retail power and energy services. 
Id.  
 137. Goelzhauser, supra note 2, at 228.  
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B.   Wholesale Competition and Open Access to Transmission Lines 
 Maintenance of a competitive market in wholesale electricity and 
the success of the deregulation model depend largely on electric 
power transmission and open access to the power grid by competing 
generators.138 However, transmission systems are natural monopolies 
that have all of the characteristics of an essential facility.139 Thus, 
the continued viability of a competitive wholesale power market re-
quires transmission owners to provide access to generators on equal 
terms and not to discriminate against other generators, if the trans-
mission owner is also in the wholesale power market.140 
C.   FERC’s Authority to Ensure Open Access to Transmission 
Systems 
 Congress’s passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA) marked the beginning of a push to move the electric power 
industry into a more market-based industry.141 PURPA included two 
provisions that helped to facilitate competition in the wholesale 
power market: (1) a provision that encouraged nonutility generators 
of electricity to be efficient and conserve power142 and (2) a provision 
that authorized FERC to mandate wheeling for wholesale customers 
and suppliers.143 This second provision was groundbreaking in that, 
for the first time, FERC had statutory authority to order an electric 
power transmission company to wheel the power of a wholesale sup-
plier of electricity. The FPC, FERC’s predecessor, did not have such 
authority under the Federal Power Act.144 Unfortunately, narrow 
court and agency interpretations of the wheeling provisions prohib-
ited their beneficial use.145  
 Thus, until the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct), 
the next major reform of electric power regulation after PURPA,  
FERC remained effectively without authority to order wholesale 
wheeling to address anticompetitive concerns in the electric power 
                                                                                                                      
 138. Lenard, supra note 136, at 37-38.   
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Goelzhauser, supra note 2, at 231.   
 142. See BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 718-19 (discussing, in a more detailed man-
ner, the relevant provisions of PURPA).  
 143. Id. at 719.  
 144. Id. Recall that this was a major obstacle for the defendant in Otter Tail. Part of its 
defense was that the municipalities could receive an order from the FPC ordering Otter 
Tail to wheel power, thus, superceding the courts’ jurisdiction regarding the plaintiff’s 
claim. The Court ruled, however, that the FPA did not grant the FPC such jurisdiction.  
 145. Id. See also Goelzhauser, supra note 2, at 231-32. Note that Bosselman, Rossi, and 
Weaver believe that, although PURPA may have never been used to enhance competition 
directly, the provisions may have had some indirect effect on competition in the industry.  
BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 719-20.  
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market. The EPAct, adopted by Congress after the first Gulf War, 
further promoted competition in the electric power market.146 The 
most significant development in the statute was that it granted 
FERC broad authority to mandate wholesale wheeling.147 Under the 
EPAct, any electric power firm participating in the wholesale market 
can apply to FERC for an order mandating that a transmission util-
ity provide wheeling services. FERC, in turn, has the authority to 
grant the request and order wheeling on “fair terms.”148 FERC has 
not shirked from the authority Congress granted in the EPAct, as it 
has ordered transmission companies to wheel power and has inter-
preted its authority to order open access broadly.149 
 FERC’s growing authority to mandate open access to electric 
power transmission lines continued in FERC’s formulation of FERC 
Order No. 888.150 The purpose of Order No. 888, consistent with the 
deregulatory model, was to “remove impediments to competition in 
the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, 
lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers.”  Generally, 
Order No. 888 required “all public utilities that own, control or oper-
ate facilities used for transmitting electric energy in interstate com-
merce” to “file open access non-discriminatory transmission tariffs 
that contain minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory 
service.”151 Part of the open access requirements of Order No. 888 
was its mandated “functional unbundling” of wholesale power gen-
eration and transmission services, which required each utility to file 
separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission and ancil-
lary services.152 Order No. 888 extended these open access require-
ments over unbundled retail transmission in interstate commerce.153 
Though Order No. 888 did not assert jurisdiction over bundled retail 
sales of electric power and require function unbundling of those 
sales,154 FERC did make Order No. 888’s open access requirements 
                                                                                                                      
 146. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 722, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).   
 147. Another important aspect of the EPAct was that it encouraged expansion of the 
independent power industry. BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 731.  
 148. Goelzhauser, supra note 2, at 232 (quoting Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. 
Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992—A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale 
Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 460 (1993)).  
 149. BOSSELMAN, supra note 130, at 732.  
 150. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities 
and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) [hereinafter Order No. 888].  The validity of Order No. 888 with respect 
to FERC’s authority to require open access was upheld in New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 
(2002).  
 151. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540.  
 152. Id. at 21,552.  
 153. Id. at 21,542. 
 154. Id. Interestingly, FERC did not conclude that it lacked jurisdictional authority 
over retail transmission; instead, it merely refused to assert such jurisdiction in the con-
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applicable to retail wheeling that requires use of interstate power 
lines.155  
 To summarize, the EPAct of 1992 gave FERC the much-needed 
statutory authority to order wheeling of wholesale bulk power. In or-
der to further facilitate a competitive, nondiscriminatory wholesale 
power market, FERC adopted Order No. 888, which required all 
wholesale power transmission services and some retail services to 
file open access tariffs. These tariffs enumerate both the price and 
terms governing a wholesale power generator’s access to transmis-
sion lines.  
V.   USE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN ELECTRIC POWER 
LITIGATION 
 Essential facilities cases in the electric power context have typi-
cally, but not always, involved wholesale or retail wheeling. For ex-
ample, in City of Malden v. Union Electric Co.,156 a municipal power 
company, Malden, brought an antitrust action against Union Electric 
on an essential facilities theory. Malden owned and operated a utility 
that generated and distributed electric power to retail customers.157 
Because Malden did not have enough capacity to satisfy customer 
demand, it entered into an agreement with Missouri Utilities158 to 
purchase wholesale power.159 Missouri Utilities and Union Electric 
owned the only direct line connecting Malden to its generation facil-
ity. Before the expiration of the wholesale contract, Malden entered 
into negotiations with Missouri Utilities to determine rates at which 
Missouri Utilities would wheel wholesale power from other producers 
to Malden.160 After a period of negotiations over wheeling rates, Mal-
den filed suit under Sherman section 1 and section 2.161 The primary 
basis for Sherman section 2 liability was the essential facilities doc-
trine.162  
 The court reiterated the elements necessary to prove an essential 
facilities claim: (1) control of an essential facility by a monopolist; (2) 
the inability to practically or economically duplicate the facility; and 
(3) the unreasonable denial of the use of the facility to a competitor 
                                                                                                                      
text of Order No. 888. Whether it would have jurisdiction over such transactions remains 
an open question. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 27-28.   
 155. See Robert J. Michaels, The Governance of Transmission Operators, 20 ENERGY 
L.J. 233, 236 (1999).  
 156. 887 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 1989).  
 157. Id. at 158.  
 158. Missouri Utilities was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Union Electric; the two later 
merged. Id. at 159.  
 159. Id. at 158.  
 160. Id. at 159. 
 161. Id. at 159-60.  
 162. See id. at 160.  
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when such use is economically and technically feasible.163 The pri-
mary issues at the trial level were whether the Missouri Util-
ity/Union Electric transmission line was the only practical method 
for Malden to receive power—the essentialness of the facility—and 
whether the conditions Missouri Utilities placed on use of the lines 
were reasonable.164 The jury found for Missouri Utilities on both is-
sues.165 On appellate review of the district court’s denial of a new 
trial, the Eighth Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s verdict against Malden.166  
 City of Malden is indicative of most essential facilities cases in-
volving wheeling in two respects. First, it appears that in most of 
these cases, the plaintiff has a great burden in proving its case and, 
more often than not, loses. Second, most, if not all, cases involving 
wheeling are initiated after negotiations over a “reasonable” wheel-
ing rate fail. In this respect, the essential facilities doctrine appears 
to offer potential plaintiffs an extra bargaining chip in negotiations 
over wheeling rates. For example, in Town of Massena v. Niagra Mo-
hawk Power Corp.,167 the court denied the plaintiff’s antitrust claim 
under Otter Tail because the power company did not unconditionally 
refuse to deal with the plaintiff.168 In support of its holding, the court 
noted the following:  
The company indicated its willingness to pursue [negotiations over 
wheeling and wholesale power purchases from the utility] and 
suggested that the meeting be held during the week of March 19, 
1979. However, before a meeting date could even be finalized, 
Massena commenced this action and unilaterally announced that 
further negotiations would be fruitless.169  
 Similarly, in City of College Station v. City of Bryan,170 the court 
noted that the dispute was essentially between two businesses ma-
neuvering to obtain the best possible deal for themselves.171 The essen-
tial facilities theory in College Station hinged primarily on whether ef-
fective access to wheeling was being denied because the transmission 
company was offering “unreasonable” rates.172 The court noted that 
“when the reasonableness of a rate is at issue, the reasonableness 
                                                                                                                      
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. at 161.  
 166. Id. at 161-62.  
 167. No. 79-CV-163, 1980 WL 1889 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 1980). Note that this case in-
volved an antitrust action under Otter Tail, not an essential facilities claim—to the extent 
that they are distinct. However, the incentive is there under both doctrines. 
 168. Id. at *24.  
 169. Id.  
 170. 932 F. Supp. 877 (S.D. Tex. 1996).  
 171. See id. at 888.  
 172. Id. at 887-88.  
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standard of the access factor cannot be read to mean that the courts 
will secure a better deal for an antitrust plaintiff . . . .”173 
 As indicated above, most essential facilities claims involving the 
electric power industry are in the context of wholesale wheeling. 
However, claims can also arise in situations where a plaintiff is seek-
ing forced retail wheeling—an area where FERC is currently without 
jurisdiction. For example, in Snake River Valley Electric Ass’n v. 
Pacificorp,174 an electric power cooperative brought a Sherman Act 
claim against Pacificorp, who had a monopoly on generation and 
transmission services in the plaintiff’s region. The cooperative in-
tended to reduce Pacificorp’s near total market share by providing 
low-cost power to its members.175 Pacificorp, however, refused to sell 
wholesale power to the cooperative and also refused to wheel power 
to the cooperative’s customers. Pacificorp filed a motion to dismiss 
the cooperative’s claim based upon state action immunity. In the al-
ternative, Pacificorp requested that the court stay the proceedings 
because FERC had jurisdiction over the matter.176 The court, in deny-
ing Pacificorp’s motion, stated that it appeared FERC had jurisdic-
tion over the transmission of the wholesale supply of electricity and 
the state regulatory body in Idaho had jurisdiction over transmission 
of that electricity to the end-user.177 Though the plaintiff in Snake 
River Valley relied on Otter Tail and not the essential facilities doc-
trine per se, the case serves as a good example of situations where 
monopoly leveraging may occur and a regulatory remedy at the fed-
eral level (via FERC) is unavailable.  
 Another context in which essential facilities claims may arise, al-
though not as frequently as wheeling cases, are disputes over access 
to power generation sources. The companion cases of City of Anaheim 
v. Southern California Edison Co.178 and City of Vernon v. Southern 
California Edison Co.179 are illustrative. Since both cases involved 
similar factual issues, a summary of only City of Anaheim’s facts is 
necessary. Several cities, including the City of Anaheim, entered into 
negotiations with Edison, an investor-owned utility, to purchase ac-
cess to the Pacific Intertie, which high-power transmission lines that 
brought low-cost hydroelectric power to Edison.180 Edison was a fully 
integrated utility, and its service areas included the areas around the 
cities that were not served by the cities themselves.181 The cities dis-
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tributed power to end customers but did not generate power—
receiving power from elsewhere over Edison’s transmission lines. The 
cities wanted firm or guaranteed access to the Pacific Intertie lines, 
but Edison refused such access because it expected to use its full ca-
pacity over those lines for Edison customers. Edison did offer the cit-
ies interruptible access.  
 The cities brought several claims under the Sherman Act against 
Edison, including a claim that the Pacific Intertie was an essential 
facility in Edison’s control and Edison unreasonably refused access to 
that source of power. The Ninth Circuit denied the cities’ essential 
facilities claim. The court held that the Pacific Intertie was not an 
essential facility because the cities had many other sources from 
which they could purchase power.182 Thus, the cities were merely at-
tempting to use the essential facilities doctrine to receive power at a 
low price to the detriment of Edison customers. Further, even if the 
Pacific Intertie was an essential facility, it had a legitimate business 
reason for denying access to the cities because Edison was simply at-
tempting to keep its costs as low as possible by using its limited ca-
pacity on the Pacific Intertie for itself.  
VI.   TRINKO AND FERC’S EXPANDED AUTHORITY TO MANDATE OPEN 
ACCESS DIMINISHES THE VIABILITY OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
DOCTRINE IN THE ELECTRIC POWER CONTEXT 
 The Supreme Court’s treatment of the essential facilities doctrine 
in Trinko raises serious questions about the doctrine’s further viabil-
ity in antitrust actions in the electric power arena. During the prolif-
eration of the doctrine from the late 1970s through the 1980s, courts 
have mostly used essential facilities in the electric power context to 
compel electric power companies to wheel power to the antitrust 
plaintiff. However, in recent years FERC has received increased 
statutory authority to mandate wheeling and open access to trans-
mission lines via the EPAct. FERC has further asserted its authority 
to mandate open access under Order No. 888. As discussed in Part 
IV, Order No. 888 requires that all transmission service companies 
in the wholesale transmission market and some in the retail trans-
mission market file nondiscriminatory, open-access tariffs for access 
to transmission services by competitors. 
 Similarly, the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 required 
incumbent LECs to offer competitors access to their network.183 In 
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disposing of the plaintiff’s essential facilities claim in Trinko, the 
Court stated that the Telecommunications Act included extensive 
provisions for access, and the essential facilities doctrine, if it exists 
at all, does not apply when a state or federal agency maintains the 
effective power to force sharing under such provisions.184 Thus, un-
availability of access is “indispensable” to antitrust plaintiffs’ essen-
tial facilities claims and a statutory scheme that provides avenues to 
gain access to a facility forecloses such claims.  
 The Trinko analysis is difficult to distinguish from a situation 
where an antitrust plaintiff brings an essential facilities claim to 
force a partially integrated power company to wheel wholesale 
power. FERC has the authority to hear and rule on petitions to man-
date wholesale wheeling under the EPAct and to ensure nondis-
criminatory access under Order No. 888. Therefore, under Trinko, 
there is no “unavailability of access” to a potential essential facilities 
plaintiff—FERC can provide access in accordance with the EPAct 
and Order No. 888.  
 In certain limited respects, however, the Telecommunications Act 
is different from FERC’s jurisdiction to order wheeling. The primary 
difference is that the Federal Communications Commission, under 
the Telecommunications Act, has jurisdiction over all incumbent 
LEC networks.185 FERC clearly has the authority under the EPAct, 
and Order No. 888 to order a wholesale power company to wheel 
power for a competitor and probably has the authority to order retail 
distributors who use FERC jurisdictional power lines to provide non-
discriminatory open access. However, FERC has reserved jurisdic-
tion over retail distribution wheeling and over fully integrated retail 
service providers. Even under the restrictive language in Trinko, an 
essential facilities claim may still be viable against such entities—
but only to the extent that a state agency does not have authority to 
mandate access to those facilities. 
 Whether the effect of the Trinko decision on essential facilities 
claims is good as a policy matter depends on one’s view of the interre-
lation between antitrust law and regulation on one hand and agency 
enforcement versus judicial enforcement on the other. Some consider 
antitrust law and regulatory law to be somewhat in conflict.186 Gov-
ernment regulations over an industry or part of an industry effec-
tively remove market mechanisms as a source of governance, making 
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antitrust law less effective as a market governing mechanism.187 Con-
versely, as an industry becomes more deregulated and more market 
forces are introduced, the role of antitrust law increases.188  
 The competing viewpoint suggests that the view of antitrust and 
regulation as competing measures is flawed because (1) “deregu-
lated” markets are still highly regulated (especially the electric 
power market) and (2) well-functioning markets and regulations of 
those markets are necessary for proper application of antitrust 
law.189 Because deregulated electricity markets remain regulated, 
“[n]ascent electricity markets have idiosyncrasies that make exer-
cises in market power highly likely: they are still subject to natural 
monopoly tendencies (e.g., transmission of electricity) and consumers 
of electricity are not responsive to price in the short-term.”190 There-
fore, active regulation is necessary to prevent market manipulation 
and exercise of market power.191 Additionally, when burgeoning mar-
kets are developing, antitrust laws typically fail to protect the con-
suming public before it suffers consequences from anticompetitive 
conduct.192 
 As mentioned above, the notion of a “deregulated” electric power 
market is somewhat of a misnomer. Even though market-based re-
forms are being implemented, the electric power market remains 
highly regulated. This is especially true with regards to the whole-
sale electric power transmission market. Most firms who are in this 
market must, pursuant to FERC regulations, provide open access to 
their transmission lines and file rates of access with FERC.193 They 
may also be subject to regulation at the state level. Therefore, more 
agency, and less judicial, intervention may be justified because there 
are not sufficient market mechanisms present to prevent competitive 
harm. This conclusion is also consistent, at least in the electric power 
context, with the second view of agency versus court regulation dis-
cussed above. Because electric power transmission is still a natural 
monopoly for the most part, active agency regulation is necessary. 
FERC is currently providing the regulation of this market through 
the EPAct and Order No. 888. Court intervention via the essential 
facilities doctrine is most likely duplicative of FERC’s efforts.  
 Additionally, continued use of the essential facilities doctrine in 
light of FERC’s regulatory capabilities may not only be duplicative, 
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but it may also have negative effects. First, the decision to force ac-
cess to transmission lines brings about the concerns Justice Scalia 
described in Trinko (along with the concerns raised by Professor Ho-
venkamp discussed in Part II): it may reduce incentives to invest in 
the facility, force the federal courts to act as central planners that 
must determine the terms of the access between the two parties, and 
facilitate collusion. A review of essential facilities cases in the electric 
power context reveals some of these difficulties—primarily with re-
spect to the role of courts as central planners. Courts must determine 
whether to grant access, what price makes access to a facility “rea-
sonable,”194 under what other terms should access be provided, and 
how to balance the incumbent’s need to serve its existing customers. 
 Additionally, courts typically do not have special expertise in how 
particular industries, such as telecommunications or electric power, 
operate. FERC, however, has specialized expertise with regard to the 
electric power industry. Further, FERC has experience in dealing 
with competitive concerns in the electric power market in terms of 
fulfilling its authority to mandate wheeling and open access, approv-
ing agreements between wholesalers and retail power companies, 
and approving mergers between power companies.195 FERC also has 
the tools available to proactively address most market failures that 
might invoke an essential facilities claim—including, of course, the 
EPAct and Order No. 888. If FERC fails in its responsibilities under 
applicable law, judicial review of its decisions to wheel or not re-
mains available under administrative law.  
 The above arguments should not be construed to justify complete 
abandonment of antitrust concerns in the electric power enterprise. 
Though Trinko probably forecloses most essential facilities claims re-
lating to open access to transmission lines within FERC’s jurisdic-
tion, complete reliance upon FERC to ensure a competitive transmis-
sion service market may be premature at this point. As previously 
noted, some activities, such as the retail wheeling concerns raised in 
the Snake River case, are presently outside of the scope of FERC’s 
authority. If and when monopoly leveraging and anticompetitive 
harm arise in these contexts, an antitrust remedy should be avail-
able to address them. It is not necessary, however, to rely on the es-
sential facilities doctrine to address anticompetitive activities in re-
lating to electric power transmission that evades regulation. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly demonstrated that anticompetitive con-
duct can be remedied through traditional antitrust principles.  
                                                                                                                      
 194. Note that this goes to the element of the essential facilities doctrine that requires 
“reasonable” access. Recall, also, that this was the primary contention in City of Ana-
heim—the cities were attempting to equate reasonable access or rates with low cost access 
at the expense of the incumbent.  955 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 195. See Envtl. Action, Inc. v. FERC, 939 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
2005]                          SAVING OTTER TAIL 257 
 
 A suggested model approach is the Otter Tail decision. As noted in 
Part II.A, Otter Tail was rooted in section 2 of the Sherman Act and 
is arguably not an essential facilities case. To the extent that Otter 
Tail is not an essential facilities case, it should remain available to 
potential antitrust plaintiffs who are damaged by the anticompetitive 
conduct of an upstream monopolist. Thus, as a guideline, Professor 
Areeda’s interpretation of Otter Tail should be used to make section 
2 of the Sherman Act available when (1) a regulated natural monopo-
list (2) engages in anticompetitive activity that evades regulation (3) 
to the prejudice of consumers.  
 The above approach partly addresses the concerns by some that, 
in relying more upon regulators to ensure competitive market con-
cerns are addressed, we should not completely eschew judicial reme-
dies, which have advantages over remedial action through regulatory 
agencies.196 These remedial advantages include a forum where dis-
covery is broader, an adjudicative body with broad discretion in its 
remedial authority, and an adjudicator not amenable to political in-
fluences.197 Such remedial advantages are evidenced in cases involv-
ing regulated industries, like Otter Tail where the court was able “to 
award pro-competitive relief without undertaking the responsibilities 
of superintending the remedy itself,” instead leaving the administra-
tion of the remedy to the regulatory body.198 Though this Comment 
stops short of endorsing the rationale that a judicial forum offers 
benefits superior to an agency forum—at least in the electric power 
context, cases have shown that essential facilities plaintiffs strategi-
cally use the broad discovery provided in courts as contract negotia-
tion leverage—retaining a Sherman Act claim under the rationale of 
Otter Tail offers a middle ground where the courts can step in and 
address anticompetitive harm that falls through the regulatory 
cracks.  
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 The efforts of Congress and FERC to introduce market-based re-
forms to electric power have succeeded in creating a large competi-
tive wholesale power market. As FERC’s regulatory scheme contin-
ues to change, courts will doubtlessly face new challenges in walking 
the line between regulatory schemes while safeguarding traditional 
antitrust principles under the Sherman Act. In Trinko, the Supreme 
Court attempted to walk this line and, in the process, may have 
ended an antitrust claim that has been a sore spot for commentators 
and antitrust defense attorneys. Though the viability of the essential 
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facilities doctrine in the regulatory field may be in decline, regulatory 
agencies should use this opportunity to continue to involve them-
selves with competitiveness concerns in their respective industries. 
FERC, for example, now has an opportunity to ensure that it is more 
active in ordering wholesale wheeling to curtail attempts at monop-
oly leveraging. Additionally, FERC should also use this opportunity 
to expand its jurisdiction to fully integrated utilities and retail dis-
tributors, in an attempt to fill the regulatory gaps of the EPAct and 
Order No. 888. 
